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INTRODUCTION
The time span between the United States Supreme Court's ap-
proval of the racially divisive separate but equal doctrine in Plessy v.
Ferguson2 and the invalidation of laws prohibiting interracial marriage
in Loving v. Virginia3 seems insurmountably long when compared to
swift judicial and legislative efforts to grant marriage equality to mem-
bers of the Lesbian, Gay, Bi-Sexual and Transgendered ("LGBT")
community. However, in its haste to provide judicial recognition to
same-sex couples, the Supreme Court has created a paradigm in which
Congress' constitutionally delegated power to regulate immigration is
at odds with these rapid jurisprudential developments.
The provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") 4
encourage unification between United States citizens and their alien5
spouses, and grant favorable immigration benefits to those alien
spouses.6 The opportunity is especially important to aliens who, upon
marriage to a United States citizen, become eligible to "fast track"
their immigration to the United States, and start their path toward
United States citizenship.' The value of an opportunity to immigrate
to the United States cannot be overstated. The Supreme Court noted
in Schneiderman v. United States,8 "it is safe to assert that nowhere in
the world today is the right to citizenship of greater worth to an indi-
vidual than it is in this country. It would be difficult to exaggerate its
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq. (2014).
5. The term "alien" is defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") Section
101(a)(3) as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
6. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2136 (2015) (plurality opinion) ("Although Congress has
tended to show 'a continuing and kindly concern . . . for the unity and happiness of the immi-
grant family,' . . . this has been a matter of legislative grace rather than fundamental right.").
7. Id. at 2131. This action was brought by the United States citizen spouse because that
alien spouse lacked standing to challenge the DHS's refusal to issue an immigration visa. ("Natu-
rally, one would expect him-not Din-to bring this suit. But because Berashk is an unadmitted
and nonresident alien, he has no right of entry into the United States, and no cause of action to
press in furtherance of his claim for admission."). Id. The Court in Din outlined the immigra-
tion procedures for an alien seeking an immigration visa. ("Under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act ... an alien may not enter and permanently reside in the United State without a visa.§ 1181(a). The INA creates a special visa-application process for aliens sponsored by 'immediate
relatives' in the United State. §§ 1151(b), 1153(a). Under this process, the citizen-relative first
files a petition on behalf of the alien living abroad, asking to have the alien classified as an
immediate relative. See §§ 1153(f), 1154(a)(1). If and when a petition is approved, the alien may
apply for a visa by submitting the required documents and appearing at a United States Embassy
or consulate for an interview with a consular officer. See §§ 1201(a)(1), 1202. Before issuing a
visa, the consular officer must ensure the alien is not inadmissible under any provision of the
INA. § 1361.") Id.
8. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
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value and importance. By many it is regarded as the highest hope of
civilized man."9
Congress has never extended this favorable immigration benefit
to alien spouses in binational same-sex marriages."0 Notwithstanding
the lack of legislative action, recent Supreme Court decisions that af-
ford constitutional rights to same-sex couples spurred the executive
branch to implement these decisions for the benefit of binational
same-sex couples seeking to live together in the United States.
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court in United States v. Wind-
sor" invalidated Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA"). 1 2  DOMA was enacted by Congress in 1996 to define
marriage under Federal law as a "legal union between one man and
one woman, and the term 'spouse' refers only to a person of the oppo-
site sex who is a husband or wife." 3 Windsor held that § 3 of DOMA
is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection under the Due Pro-
cess Clause14 of the Fifth Amendment.15 Windsor's invalidation of § 3
of DOMA removed the federal statutory barrier that prevented bina-
tional same-sex couples from becoming eligible for immigration bene-
fits. However, Congress has not amended the INA following Windsor
to address whether binational same-sex marriages would be recog-
nized for immigration purposes, or defined the terms "marriage" or
"spouse" to include same-sex relationships.
President Barack Obama attempted to fill the gap regarding the
federal definitions of the terms "marriage" and "spouse" by an exer-
9. Id. at 122.
10. Vy Nhu Hoang Dinh v. United States, 2014 WL 3513379, at *5 (D. Nev. July 14, 2014)
("A U.S. citizen may petition for his spouse (the beneficiary) to be classified as an 'immediate
relative' by filing a Form 1-130 Petition for Alien Relative .... If granted, this classification
allows the spouse to 'jump the line' and immediately apply for temporary lawful permanent
resident ("LPR") status by filing a Form 1-485 Application to Register Permanent Resident or
Adjust Status.").
11. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
12. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 110 Stat. 2419, Pub. L. 104-199, enacted Sept.
21, 1996.
13. Id.
14. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "No person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . U.S. CoNs-r.
amend. V.
15. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 ("The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its mar-
riage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection
and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.").
2016]
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cise of Executive Action.' 6 Following Windsor, President Obama di-
rected then Attorney General Eric Holder, through the Department
of Justice, to implement "the Windsor decision across the entire fed-
eral government."17 Efforts to implement Windsor included a direc-
tive from former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") Janet Napolitano directing the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Service ("USCIS") 18 to "review immigration visa peti-
tions filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those
filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse."' 9 The invalidation of § 3 of
DOMA by the Supreme Court in Windsor was welcomed by
thousands of binational same-sex couples who wanted to live together
in the United States.2 °
16. See e.g., Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to the President of the
United States (June 20, 2014).
17. Id.; see also id. at 3 ("At your direction, the Department of Justice immediately began
working with other deferral agencies to make the promise of the Windsor decision a reality-to
identify every federal law, rule, policy, and practice in which marital status is a relevant consider-
ation, expunge Section 3's discriminatory effect, and ensure that committed and loving married
couples throughout the country would receive equal treatment by their federal government re-
gardless of their sexual orientation.").
18. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history
(last updated Sept. 8, 2015) ("On March 1, 2003, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) assumed responsibility for the immigration service functions of the federal government.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135) dismantled the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) and separated the former agency into three compo-
nents within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Homeland Security Act
created USCIS to enhance the security and improve the efficiency of national immigration ser-
vices by focusing exclusively on the administration of benefit applications. The law also formed
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to
oversee immigration enforcement and border security.").
19. Janet Napolitano, Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Mar-
riage Act, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/topic/implementation-supreme-
court-ruling-defense-marriage-act (last updated July 21, 2015) ("After last week's decision by the
Supreme Court holding that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is unconstitu-
tional, President Obama directed federal departments to ensure the decision and its implication
for federal benefits for same-sex legally married couples are implemented swiftly and smoothly.
To that end, effective immediately, I have directed U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) to review immigration visa petitions filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same
manner as those filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse."); see also Kate Woodsome, US Im-
migration Service Ordered to Consider Same-Sex Visa Petitions, VOICE OF AMERICA (July 1,
2013, 7:43 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/us-immigration-ordered-to-consider-petitions-
of-gay-spouses/1693182.html; Chris Good, Kerry Announces Visas for Same-Sex Couples, ABC
NEws (Aug. 2, 2013), www.abcnews.go.comlblogslpolitics/2013/08/kerry-announces-visas-for-
same-sex-couples; Michael R. Gordon, New U.S. Policy Gives Equal Treatment to Same-Sex
Spouses' Visa Applications, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/
world/us-to-give-equal-treatment-to-same-sex-spouses-visa-applications.html.
20. Moni Basu, Love Wins in Gay Couple's 40-year Immigration Fight, CNN (June 28,
2014), www.cnn.com/20l4/06/26/US/gay-rights-immigration-struggle/; Mike Spradley, Breaking
Down Immigration Rules for Same-Sex Binational Couples, HUFFINGTON POST GAY VOICES
(July, 1, 2013), www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-spradley/breaking-down-immigration-rules-for-
same-sex-binational-couples b 3523015.html.
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President Obama's bold decision to extend federal benefits to
United States citizens and binational same-sex married couples was
bolstered by the Supreme Court's landmark decision, on June 26,
2015, to legalize same-sex marriage. In Obergefell v. Hodges,21 the
Court held that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry
that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's 22 guarantees of Due
Process and Equal Protection.23 This decision does not, however, re-
quire Congress to recognize binational same-sex married couples eli-
gible for immigration benefits. 4
An alien spouse in a binational marriage certainly has the right
under Obergefell to have this marriage legally recognized for all pur-
poses in the United States except within the field of immigration. This
decision did not, however, grant alien spouses the right to immigrate
to the United States. In fact, alien immigrants have "no constitution-
ally protected right to an immigrant visa," regardless of the constitu-
tional rights granted to the United States citizens and lawful
permanent residents.2 The Constitution has no extraterritorial effect,
and immigration is only a "privilege granted by the sovereign United
States government. '2 6 Although the Obergefell decision is a tremen-
dous victory for the LGBT community, marriage equality has not
been fully realized for binational same-sex spouses seeking to unite
with their citizen spouses in the United States.
The unintended consequence of this radical shift in immigration
policies is representative of a pattern27 of immigration reform under-
21. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
22. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").
23. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
24. Following the Obergefell decision, Attorney General Loretta Lynch announced that
"[flederal marriage benefits [would] be made available to same-sex couples. Attorney General
Lynch stated "I have directed Justice Department staff to work with the agencies to ensure that
the ruling be given full effect across the federal government." Same-sex Couples to get Federal
Marriage Benefits, US Attorney General, MSN (July 9, 2015), http://www.msn.comlen-us/news/us/
same-sex-couples-to-get-federal-marriage-benefits-us-attorney-general/ar-AAL5kc.
25. Ringgold v. Johnson, 40 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1342 (D. Haw. 2014).
26. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
27. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015) (Twenty-six states chal-
lenged President Obama's "Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Resident Program ("DAPA") as violative of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the
Take Care Clause of the Constitution."); United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774,
780 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (discussing President Obama's Executive Action, dated November 20, 2014,
which "announced two different 'enforcement' policies: (1) a policy that expanded the granting
of deferred action status to certain categories of undocumented immigrants; and, (2) a policy
that updated the removal/deportation priorities for certain categories of undocumented immi-
2016]
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taken by the Obama administration that ignores the powers granted
to Congress to establish a "uniform Rule of Naturalization."28 Not-
withstanding President Obama's noble objectives, the exercise of ex-
ecutive action to implement Windsor within the field of immigration is
inconsistent with the constitutional delegation of legislative authority
granted to Congress to regulate the field of immigration, and with
Congressional plenary power to determine the categories of persons
who are eligible to immigrate to the United States. It calls into ques-
tion the Supreme Court's longstanding affirmation of Congress' ple-
nary power 29 to regulate the field of immigration exemplified by
Justice Powell's statement in Fiallo v. Bell,3" that "'over no conceiva-
ble subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it
is over' the admission of aliens., 31
It is important to note that the legislative and executive branches
of the federal government share power to regulate the country's immi-
gration policies.3 2 However, only Congress can determine the eligibil-
ity categories for aliens seeking immigration visas.33 The role of the
grants"); see also ROBERTO G. GONZALES & ANGIE M. BAUTISTA-CHAVEZ, AMERICAN IMMI-
GRATION COUNCIL, Two YEARS AND COUNTING: ASSESSING THE GROWING POWER OF DACA
(2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/two-years and-counting-assess
ingthe.growing-power of dacafinal.pdf; Julia Hirschfeld Davis, Obama's Immigration Action
Has Precedents, But May Set a New One, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/11/21/us/politics/obamas-immigration-decision-has-precedents-but-mayset-a-new-one
.html.
28. Congress is authorized "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
29. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) ("In the recent case of
Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336, the court, in sustaining the action of
the executive department, putting in force an act of congress for the exclusion of aliens, said: 'It
is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent
in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe. In the United States this power is vested in the national government, to which the
constitution has committed the entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in
war. It belongs to the political department of the government, and may be exercised either
through treaties made by the president and senate or through statutes enacted by congress."');
see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (recognizing Congress's "plenary power to
make rules for admission of aliens and to exclude these who possess those characteristics which
Congress has forbidden.").
30. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
31. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) ("[T]hat the formulation of these policies is
entrusted to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissue
of our body politic as any aspect of our government.").
32. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1465 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Congress and the Executive
branch share the immigration power.") (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,
659 (1892)).
33. Id. at 1466 ("Congress traditionally exercises authority over matters of immigration and
exclusion through passage of immigration legislation."); see also United States ex rel. Knauff v.
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executive branch is to enforce the immigration legislation enacted by
Congress.3 4 The executive branch has broad, but not unlimited,
prosecutorial discretion to enforce immigration policies, specifically
regarding deportation and removal of aliens from the country.35 Pres-
ident Obama's executive action to expand the category of aliens who
may be eligible for an immigration visa based upon binational same-
sex marriages falls outside of the scope of his executive authority to
regulate immigration.
This research project will attempt to reconcile the immigration
landscape following Obergefell and Windsor with the plenary powers
granted to Congress to regulate the field of immigration. This Article
will argue that President Obama's efforts to provide immigration ben-
efits to alien spouses in binational same-sex marriages infringes upon
Congress' power to determine the categories of aliens permitted to
immigrate to the United States. This Article will also explore whether
the implementation of Obergefell and Windsor on behalf of binational
same-sex couples contravenes the separation of powers between the
two branches of the federal government charged with administration
of the country's immigration policies. This project will argue that in
the absence of Congressional legislation that incorporates same-sex
marriages and spouses into the immigration paradigm, neither the re-
peal of DOMA or judicial recognition of same sex marriage will in-
sure that immigration benefits will remain available to binational
same-sex families.
I. JURISPRUDENTIAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PERSONS
Members of the LGBT community aggressively fought to achieve
legislative and common law recognition of their rights. Recognition of
LGBT rights changed the social fabric of this country, and paved the
way for Congress to relax restrictions on barriers that limited the abil-
ity of LGBT aliens to visit and immigrate to the United States.
2016]
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) ("Normally Congress supplies the conditions of the privi-
lege of entry into the United States.").
34. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543.
35. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
Howard Law Journal
A. Legal Recognition of LGBT Aliens
Aliens, regardless of their sexual orientation, do not have a con-
stitutional right to enter the United States.36 Admission of aliens into
the United States falls within the Congressional authority to establish
regulations defining the categories of aliens permitted to enter our
borders.37 There is a long history of legislative barriers that prevented
LGBT aliens from coming to the United States.38 The provisions of
the INA expressly excluded LGBT aliens from coming to the United
States.39 Prior versions of the INA classified LGBT aliens as un-
desirables4" because they were "afflicted with a psychopathic person-
ality, or sexual deviation."41 As such, homosexuals were "ineligible to
receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United
States.
42
In Boutilier v. INS,4 3 the Supreme Court upheld the deportation"
of a gay man on the ground that he was a homosexual at the time of
his entry into the United States. Pursuant to the provisions of the
INA, which were later repealed in 1990, the alien was "a homosexual
and therefore 'afflicted with psychopathic personality, and excluda-
ble."' 45 Similarly in 1982, the District Court in Lesbian/Gay Freedom
Day Committee v. INS46 upheld an INS determination that an alien
seeking to come to the United States as a "nonimmigrant visitor for
36. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
37. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596-97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
38. See Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, 571-73 (N.D. Cal.
1982) (discussing the "History of the Exclusion of Homosexual Aliens from Entry Into the
United States").
39. Id.; see also KEVIN JOHNSON, THE HUDDLED MASSES MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 140-45 (2004).
40. JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 140.
41. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 121-22 (1967).
42. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., 541 F. Supp. at 572 (citing Act of October 3, 1965
amending INA § 212(a)(4), Pub.L.No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4))).
43. Boutilier, 387 U.S. 118.
44. United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 479 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Before
IIRIRA's enactment in 1996, individuals such as Lopez-Vasquez who were ineligible for admis-
sion into the United States and were never admitted into the United States were referred to as
'excludable,' while aliens who had gained admission, but later became subject to expulsion from
the United States, were referred to as 'deportable.' ... In addition, the IIRIRA [Illegal Immigra-
tion and Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] has 'done away with the previous
legal distinction among deportation, removal, and exclusion proceedings .... Now, the term
'removal proceedings,' refers to proceedings applicable to both inadmissible and deportable
aliens.").
45. Boutiliner, 387 U.S. at 119.
46. See Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., 541 F. Supp. at 576.
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pleasure"47 was "per se excludable" because he was a homosexual. 8
Citing the statutory exclusion of LGBT aliens dating back to 1917, the
District Court concluded that the alien would "be continually barred
from entry into the United States as long as a policy of excluding
homosexuals per se from entry is in effect."49
As legal recognition and acceptance of the LGBT community in-
creased, Congress removed the statutory barriers that excluded LGBT
aliens from coming to the United States. The Immigration Act of
199050 eliminated references to "psychopathic personality" or "sexual
deviation" as grounds for visa ineligibility." Although Congress elim-
inated the exclusion barriers, the INA was not subsequently revised to
make favorable immigration benefits readily available to LGBT
aliens. For example, Congress enacted legislation that encouraged
family unification between United States citizens and their alien
spouses, but Congress has never extended this immigration benefit to
binational same-sex spouses.
Notwithstanding the elimination of admission barriers, Congress
sustained its generally hostile outlook to the growing acceptance of
the LGBT community, and enacted legislation that defined marriage
as a union between opposite sex couples.5" This served as an impene-
trable barrier for all members of the LGBT community, including citi-
zens and aliens alike, to gain access to any federal benefits, including
marital immigration benefits. 3 The burden then fell on the LGBT
community to raise intra-territorial judicial challenges to domestic
policies and that discriminated against them and deprived them of
constitutional rights.
B. Legal Recognition of LGBT Citizens
The fight to achieve equality for the LGBT community within the
United States started in earnest with the Hawaiian Supreme Court's
decision in Baehr v. Lewin,54 which held that Hawaii's marriage law
that denied marriage licenses to same-sex couples solely on the basis
47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (2012). This temporary, non-immigrant visa is commonly
referred to as a "B-2" Visitor for Pleasure.
48. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., 541 F. Supp. at 588.
49. Id. at 576.
50. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101--649, 104 Stat. 4978.
51. See § 601, 104 Stat. 5067 (codified as INA § 212(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (2014)).
52. See discussion of DOMA infra Part III.
53. Id.
54. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex).
2016]
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of their sexual orientation was an unconstitutional denial of equal pro-
tection." Notwithstanding the holding of Baehr, marriage equality
was never realized in Hawaii following this decision. DOMA was en-
acted in direct response to Baehr,56 and soon thereafter, Hawaii
amended its constitution in 1998 to prohibit same-sex marriage.57
At the same time that the Hawaiian Supreme Court was consid-
ering marriage equality, the United States Supreme Court in Romer v.
Evans,58 was considering the constitutionality of an amendment to
Colorado's constitution which "prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive
or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to
protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual per-
sons, or gays and lesbians."59 Justice Kennedy authored the opinion
for the Court in which he concluded that Amendment 2 violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment by classifying LGBT
persons in a manner that was "unequal to everyone else,"6 noting
that "[a] State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws."6 Such a classification "impos[ed] a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group. 6
2
Following Romer, the LGBT community focused its efforts on
the eradication of laws that treat members of the LGBT community as
"second class citizens."63 The fight for legal equality can be divided
into two phases. The first phase focused on judicial challenges to leg-
islative efforts to regulate personal relationships between same-sex
55. The Court subjected the Hawaiian statute to an evaluation under the strict scrutiny
standard in order to "overcome the presumption that HRS § 572-1 is unconstitutional by demon-
strating that it furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgments of constitutional rights." Id. at 68. In so doing the Court held that "on its face and
as applied, HRS § 572-1 denies same-sex couples access to the marital status and its concomitant
rights and benefits, thus implicating the equal protection clause of Article I, section 5." Id. at 67.
56. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 18 ("H.R. 3936 [DOMA] is inspired, again, not by the
effect of Baehr v. Lewin inside Hawaii, but rather by the implications that lawsuit threatens to
have on the other States and on Federal law.").
57. See HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23. Subsequently, Hawaii legally recognized same-sex mar-
riage in 2013 with the passage of the Hawaii Marriage Equality Act, Act 1, 2nd Special Session,
Session Laws of Hawaii 2013.
58. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
59. Id. at 624.
60. Id. at 631-35.
61. Id. at 635.
62. Id. at 632.
63. See generally Elton John Feels Like 'Second-Class Citizen', CBS L.A. (Jan. 23, 2011, 8:59
AM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.co 121l0123/elton-john-feels-like-second-class-citizen/; 'Sec-
ond Class Citizens,' Planned Gay Rights Movement Documentary, HUFFINGTON PosT GAY
VoicEs (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20121ll17/second-class-citizens-planned-
gay-rights-documentary-n-1210779.html.
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persons. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick64 the plaintiffs argued
that Georgia's sodomy statute violated their fundamental rights to en-
gage in private, consensual sexual behavior.65 The Supreme Court
ruled to the contrary, noting that the court was not predisposed to
"extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of con-
sensual sodomy."66
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas67
shifted the focus from examining the constitutionality of the right of
"two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual con-
duct,"6 8 and redirected the discussion to what became the second
phase of the judicial fight for legal equality; the judicial recognition of
liberty and privacy rights for the LGBT community that are protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.69
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court acknowledged that same-sex
couples have a constitutionally protected liberty interest that "gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."7 Justice Kennedy
noted that the constitutional framers could not have foreseen that the
boundaries of the Due Process Clause would expand to protect pri-
vate, consensual sexual conduct between same sex couples. 7' How-
ever, the Court did recognize that "[a]s the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom."' 72  Recognition of this constitutionally
protected right led the Court to overturn its decision in Bowers, hold-
ing that "[t]he rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful
analysis. '73
64. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
65. Id. at 189.
66. Id. at 192.
67. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
68. Id. at 562.
69. Id. at 564, 567 ("When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.").
70. Id. at 572.
71. Id. at 578 ("Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight.
They knew time can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress."); Id. at 578-79.
72. Id. at 579.
73. Id. at 577.
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Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence foreshadowed the growing
"culture war"74 over constitutional recognition of same-sex marriage
noting disbelief in the majority's statement that the decision in Law-
rence "does not involve whether the government must give formal rec-
ognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. '7 5
Justice Scalia noted that the holding in Lawrence is symptomatic of "a
Court that is impatient of democratic change,"76 and that sweeping
changes "are to be made by the people, and not imposed by a gov-
erning caste that knows best."77 Scalia's unease that "judicial imposi-
tion of homosexual marriage" could be a consequence of the
expansion of the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause
proved to be a legitimate concern.
Twelve years later, Justice Scalia's prognostication was realized
when the Court announced its much anticipated decision in
Obergefell. Relying upon Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of lib-
erty and equal protection of the laws, the Court held that "the right to
marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of
that right and that liberty."78
Obergefell was an action consolidated from four cases filed in
"Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee."79 Each state followed
the traditional definition of marriage "as a union between one man
74. See id. at 558, 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("One of the most revealing statements in
today's opinion is the Court's grim warning that the criminalization of homosexual conduct is 'an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres.' It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its
role assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed. Many
Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their
business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders
in their homes. They view this as protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that
they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views it as 'discrimination', which it is the
function of our judgments to deter. So imbued is the Court with the law professor's anti-anti-
homosexual culture, that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obvi-
ously 'mainstream'; that in most States what the Court calls 'discrimination' against those who
engage in homosexual acts is perfectly legal ....").
75. See id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("At the end of its opinion-after having laid waste
the foundations our rational-basis jurisprudence-the Court says that the present case 'does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosex-
ual persons seek to enter.' Do not believe it.").
76. See id. at 603.
77. Id. at 603-04.
78. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
79. Id. at 2593.
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and one woman."8 The plaintiffs raised two issues before the Court.
First, the Court considered whether the defendant States were in vio-
lation of "the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to
marry."81 The Obergefell majority considered four principles that
"demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples."82 First, that
"the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the
concept of individual autonomy."83 Second, the right to marry "sup-
ports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the
committed individuals."84 Third, is "that it safeguards children and
families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing,
procreation, and education."85 Finally, the fourth principle is that
"[m]arriage is a keystone of our social order."8 6
Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion. He rejected calls
to "adopt a cautious approach to recognizing and protecting funda-
mental rights" of same-sex couples to marry.87 Instead, the Court
reached a groundbreaking and highly controversial decision. Justice
Kennedy analogized the discrimination88 faced by same-sex couples
with the burdens imposed on the interracial couple in Loving, and the
financially delinquent father in Zablocki v. Redhail.89 The majority
found a "connection between marriage and liberty" that is grounded
in the "fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person," under
the Due Process and Equal Protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 90
The second issue that the Court considered in Obergefell was
whether full faith and credit considerations require states to give full
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2599.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2600.
86. Id. at 2601.
87. Id. at 2606.
88. Id. at 2602 ("Loving did not ask about a 'right to interracial marriage'; Turner did not
ask about a 'right to inmates to marry'; and Zablocki did not ask about a 'right of fathers with
unpaid child support duties to marry.' Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its
comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class
from the right.").
89. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 394 (1978).
90. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599, 2604 ("Like Loving and Zablocki, these precedents show
the Equal Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution of
marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution."). Id. at 2604.
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recognition "to marriages, lawfully performed in another state."'"
Justice Kennedy expressed concern for "instability and uncertainty"
arising from "recognition bans" on same-sex marriages that were law-
fully performed in other states.92 The Obergefell decision held that
"recognition bans inflict substantial and continuing harm on same-sex
couples." As a result, the Court effectively abrogated § 2 of DOMA
by holding that "there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recog-
nize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the
ground of its same-sex character."93
Although this decision illustrates a radical and controversial shift
in the fabric of American society, its impact on American immigration
policies remains unsettled. The Constitution clearly vests Congress,
not the Supreme Court, with the principle responsibility of regulating
our nation's immigration policies. Reliance upon the intra-territorial
legalization of same-sex marriage does not provide the immigration
benefits that bi-national same-sex couples seek.94
II. INVALIDATION OF THE FEDERAL DEFINITION
OF MARRIAGE
The federal definition of marriage as a relationship between op-
posite-sex partners was codified in the Defense of Marriage Act,
DOMA, which was signed by then President William Clinton in
1996.9' This landmark legislation was enacted in response to a per-
ceived "legal assault against traditional heterosexual marriage laws,"9 6
following Hawaii's Supreme Court's ruling in Baehr. DOMA had two
relevant provisions. Section 2 permitted states to "decline to give ef-
fect to marriage licenses from another state if they relate to 'marriage'
between persons of the same sex." 97 Section 3 of DOMA amended
the definitional section of Title 1 of the United States Code by adding
91. Id. at 2593.
92. Id. at 2607.
93. Id.
94. A long-standing maxim of immigration law is that bi-national couples have no constitu-
tionally protected right to live in the United States with an alien spouse. See Udugampola v.
Jacobs, 70 F. Supp. 3d 33, 41 (D.D.C. 2014) ("[T]he Constitution protects an individual's right to
marry, and the marital relationship ... 'these constitutional rights are not implicated when one
spouse is removed, or denied entry into the United States."') (citing Udugampola v. Jacobs, 795
F. Supp. 2d 96, 105 (2011)).
95. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
96. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 4 (1996).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C ("No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
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Section 7 to create a federal definition of 'marriage' and 'spouse' that
was limited to "only a legal union between one man and one woman
as husband and wife ....98
The definitions of the terms marriage and spouse set forth in Sec-
tion 3 only applied to the interpretation and application of federal
laws and regulations. As a result, one consequence of DOMA was the
denial of immigration benefits to bi-national same-sex couples that
were lawfully married in states or countries that recognized same-sex
marriages. 99 Although judicial efforts were initiated on behalf of bi-
national same-sex couples, DOMA's clear prohibition stood as a bar-
rier to any forms of immigration relief.1"'
Following the election of President Obama, negative sentiment
against DOMA began to grow. The discriminatory, "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy banning gays from military service was repealed.' 0°
Thereafter, President Obama announced that, although his adminis-
tration would continue to enforce DOMA, he believed that the legis-
lation was unconstitutional, and as a result, the Attorney General and
the Justice Department would not defend DOMA on behalf of the
United States.
Almost twenty years after its enactment, the constitutionality of
DOMA was examined by the United States Supreme Court in Wind-
sor. ' 2 The plaintiff in Windsor, Edie Windsor, challenged Section 3
of DOMA, which defined marriage for the purposes of controlling
federal statutes and regulations as "a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife. 10 3 Under DOMA, the plaintiff
could not qualify for a spousal inheritance tax exemption because her
same-sex marriage was not recognized. 10 4 As a result, the Internal
Revenue Service accessed a $363,053 tax bill against Windsor because
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or
a right or claim arising from such relationship.").
98. 1 U.S.C. § 7 ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as hus-
band and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a hus-
band or a wife.").
99. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE AcT: UPDATE TO
PRIOR REPORT, GAO-04-353R (2004), http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/92441.pdf.
100. See generally James R. Edwards, Jr., Homosexuals and Immigration: Developments in
the United States and Abroad, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (May 1999), http://cis.org/Immigration%
2526Homosexuals-PolicyTowardHomosexuals.
101. Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010).
102. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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she did not qualify as a "surviving spouse" notwithstanding her mar-
riage in Canada to her long-term companion and domestic partner.10 5
The Court in Windsor considered the role played by the federal
government in regulating marital relationships. The Court acknowl-
edged the long-standing precept that the regulation of marriage is an
area traditionally relegated to state governments.0 6 The Court noted
that "by history and tradition the definition and regulation of mar-
riage ... has been treated as being within the authority and realm of
the separate states."'0 7 The regulation of marriage by State govern-
ment was not a grant of absolute authority. The Court recognized that
in appropriate circumstances, the federal government "in enacting dis-
crete statutes, can make determinations that bear on marital rights
and privileges.' 01 8 Examples where the federal government enacted
regulations pertaining to marriage include federal life insurance bene-
ficiary designations, immigration eligibility based upon marriage to
United States citizens and Social Security benefit determinations. 10 9
The Court recognized that the federal government can regulate
the definition of marriage "in order to further federal policy," how-
ever, the provisions of DOMA reached impermissibly into areas that
were historically regulated by the states." 0 DOMA "because of its
reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on
state law to define marriage." '' As Justice Scalia predicted in his dis-
senting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas," 2 the Windsor decision noted
that states, have a legitimate interest in protecting and recognizing the
dignity of marital relationships that are consistent with the formation
of consensus respecting the "way the members of a discrete commu-
105. Id.
106. State regulation of marriage is also tempered by the constitutional guarantees afforded
to persons. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 957 (2003) ("It is undoubt-
edly for these concrete reasons, as well as for its intimately personal significance, that civil mar-
riage has long been termed a 'civil right.' The United States Supreme Court has described the
right to marry as 'of fundamental importance for all individuals' and as 'part of the fundamental
'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
107. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689-90 ("The responsibility of the States for the regulation of
domestic relations is an important indicator of the substantial societal impact the State's classifi-
cations have in the daily lives and customs of its people. DOMA's unusual deviation from the
usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to de-
prive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition
of their marriage."); Id. at 2693.
108. Id. at 2690.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2692
112. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
[VOL. 59:305
Premature Celebration
nity treat each other in their daily contact and constant interaction
with each other""l 3 or the enduring personal bonds created by mem-
bers of the community.
The Supreme Court concluded that the consequence of DOMA
was to "injure the very class NY seeks to protect.""' 4 In so doing,
DOMA violated "basic due process and equal protection principles
applicable to the federal government.""' 5 As a result, the Court held
that "DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the
person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution."
116
The outcome of Windsor was that it invalidated Section 3 of DOMA,
thus eliminating the federal definition of marriage. Windsor, how-
ever, left Section 2's full faith and credit provisions untouched.' The
Windsor decision to invalidate Section 3 of DOMA, left no federal
statutory definition of marriage to govern the interpretation of federal
codes and regulations. Also, in the absence of a federal definition of
marriage, the question remained as to how to define marriage and
spouse for the purposes for immigration laws.
Windsor's invalidation of DOMA removed the statutory bar that
prevented bi-national same-sex couples from seeking immigration
benefits. President Obama attempted to fill the gap regarding the fed-
eral definitions of marriage and spouse by an exercise of his executive
authority. Following Windsor, President Obama directed then Secre-
tary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano to issue a letter directing
the USCIS to "review immigration visa petitions filed on behalf of a
same-sex spouse in the same manner as those filed on behalf of an
opposite-sex spouse.""
a18
113. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
114. Id. at 2693.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2695.
117. Lisa Guillien, Recognition of Existing Same-Sex Marriages, NOLO: LAW FOR ALL, http:/
/www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/recognition-same-sex-gay-marriage-32294.html ("However,
the Court did not address Section 2 of DOMA, which allows states to ignore valid same-sex
marriages entered into in other states, or whether Section 2 would impact federal recognition.
For example, the Court did not address whether the IRS (or other federal agencies) would rec-
ognize the marriages of same-sex married couples living in non-recognition states.").
118. Napolitano, supra note 19.
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III. RECOGNITION OF BI-NATIONAL SAME-SEX SPOUSE
FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES
A. Adams v. Howerton
The provisions of the INA offer a significant number of immigra-
tion benefits that are dependent upon marital status." 9For example,
the most favored immigrant visa categories is for immediate relatives
of United States citizens, INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i)1 20 defines immediate
relative as "the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the
United States."' 21 This immigration category requires consideration
of two additional categories. The term "spouse" is not defined in the
INA. INA § 101(a)(35) only prohibits proxy marriages where the par-
ties "are not physically present in the presence of each other, unless
the marriage shall have been consummated.' 22
The INA does not set forth a federal definition of marriage.' 23
The word "spouse" as defined in § 101(a)(35) of the INA is of limited
assistance in this regard. The INA specifically excludes recognition of
proxy marriages, which are marriages "where the contracting parties
thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other, unless
the marriage shall have been consummated." The statutory language
in § 101(a)(35) does not, however, address whether same-sex mar-
riages will be recognized for immigration purposes. In the absence of
a statutory definition for marriage, or guidance regarding whether
same sex marriages warrant eligibility for immigration benefits, immi-
gration officials sought guidance from common law jurisprudence.
119. See In re Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec. 158, 159 (B.I.A. 2013) (noting that the repeal of
Section 3 of DOMA afforded same-sex persons the opportunity to apply for a variety of immi-
gration benefits "including, but not limited to, sections 101(a)(15)(K)(fianc6 and fiancee visas),
203 and 204 (immigrant visa petitions), 207 and 208) (refugee and asylee derivative status), 212
(inadmissibility and waivers of inadmissibility), 237 (removability and waivers of removability),
240A (cancellation of removal), and 245 (adjustment of status) .... "); see also U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Servs., Same Sex Marriage Frequently Asked Questions ("Under the U.S. immi-
gration laws, eligibility for a wide range of benefits depends on the meanings of the terms 'mar-
riage' or 'spouse.' Examples include (but are not limited to) an alien who seeks to qualify as a
spouse accompanying or following to join a family-sponsored immigrant, an employment-based
immigrant, certain subcategories of nonimmigrants, or alien who has been granted refugee status
or asylum. In all of these cases, a same-sex marriage will be treated exactly as an opposite sex
marriage.").
120. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 1101 (a)(35).
123. The INA does offer guidance regarding the definition of marriage. INA § 216(d)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1186a (2012), defines the term "qualifying marriage" for the purpose of receiving a
conditional PRA status as a result of a marriage to a United States citizen or LPR if the mar-
riage is less than 24 months before the petitioning alien obtains the status.
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Until portions of this decision were abrogated by Obergefell, the
case of Adams v. Howerton,124 was the controlling precedent on this
issue. In Adams, a bi-national same-sex couple that was purportedly
married in Colorado, sought an immigrant visa for the putative alien
as an immediate relative spouse of a United States citizen.125 The
Ninth Circuit proffered a two-prong test to determine whether their
marriage was eligible for recognition in accordance with the provi-
sions of the INA. 1 26 The first prong of the test required the Court to
consider "whether the marriage is valid under State law." '127 Ques-
tions regarding the validity of marriages for immigration purposes are
determined by examining "the law of the place of celebration."' 28
The Court did not reach the issue of whether "Colorado law per-
mit[ted] homosexual marriages," because the Ninth Circuit decided
the cases solely on the basis of the second prong of the test which
required the Court to consider "whether state-approved marriage
qualifies under the Act. 12
9
The second prong of the analysis required the Ninth Circuit to
examine Congressional intent underlying the enactment of section
201(b). 130 The Court noted that "the intent of Congress governs the
conferral of spouse status under Section 201(b), and a valid marriage
is determinative only if Congress so intends." '131 Upon finding no
Congressional consideration of same-sex marriages in the legislative
history of section 201, the Ninth Circuit held that "Congress intended
124. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
125. Adams asserted that the INS's application of Section 201(b) only to heterosexual
couples violated the Equal Protection Clause. Citing Congress' undisputed plenary power to
govern immigration, the Court noted that Congressional decisions are subject only to "limited
judicial review." Adams, 673 F.2d at 1042. The Ninth Circuit resolved the Equal Protection
challenge by holding that "Congress's decision to confer spouse status under section 201(b) only
upon the parties to heterosexual marriages has a rational basis and therefore comports with the
due process clause and its equal protection requirement." Id.
126. See also In re Lovo-Lara, 23 t. & N. Dec. 746 (B.I.A. 2005).
127. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038.
128. Id. at 1038-39.
129. Id. at 1038.
130. Id. at 1039.
131. Id. The evaluation of Congressional intent required the Court to examine several fac-
tors, including the ordinary meaning of the terms 'spouse' and 'marriage.' The Court also con-
sidered the Legislative history of the term 'spouse.' Noting that there is "nothing in the [INA],
the 1965 amendments or the Legislative history suggests that the reference to 'spouse' in section
201(b) was intended to include a person of the same sex as the citizen in question." The Ninth
Circuit also examined the INS's interpretation of the term 'spouse.' Recognizing that "substan-
tial deference" is ordinarily accorded to the interpretations of the enforcing agency, the Ninth
Circuit held that the INS had also interpreted the term "spouse" to "exclude a person entering a
homosexual marriage." Id. at 1040.
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that only partners in heterosexual marriages be considered spouses
under section 201(b). ' 32 The Ninth Circuit in Adams, refused to ex-
pand the definition of spouse to include the same-sex member of a bi-
national couple, relying in part, on the commonly understood defini-
tion of spouse.1 3 3 The Ninth Circuit noted that:
Congress has not indicated an intent to enlarge the ordinary
meaning of those words. In the absence of such a congressional di-
rective, it would be inappropriate for us to expand the meaning of
the term 'spouse' for immigration purposes. [citation omitted] Our
role is only to ascertain and apply the intent of Congress.134
The Ninth Circuit specifically relied upon the Plenary Powers
doctrine and looked to Congress to determine whether the alien
spouse was eligible for an immigration visa. The Court in Adams
noted that the legality of the bi-national same-sex marriage was "in-
sufficient to confer spouse status for the purpose of federal immigra-
tion law.' 1 35 It is Congress "that determine[s] the conditions under
which immigration visas are issued." '13 6
Adams was accepted as controlling precedent for over 30 years
until three pivotal developments: the Windsor decision; 137 President
Obama's directive to the DHS to "review immigration visa petitions
filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those filed
on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse; ' '138 and the Obergefell decision
that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry that is pro-
tected by the "Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment." '139 Notwithstanding this dynamic change in the
definition of marriage, the statutory framework of the INA, which
does not expressly recognize bi-national same-sex marriages remains
unchanged.
An unsettled question remains regarding whether the decisions in
Obergefell and Windsor have any controlling impact on federal immi-
132. Id. at 1041.
133. Following Adams, under § 3 of DOMA, the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Service ("USCIS"), formerly the INS, was prevented from recognizing marriages between same-
sex bi-national couples.
134. Id. at 1049.
135. Id. at 1039.
136. Id.
137. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688-90 (2013). Winsdor held that § 3 of
DOMA is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
138. Napolitano, supra note 19.
139. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
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gration policies that determine whether bi-national same-sex mar-
riages will be eligible for immigration benefits. First, the holding in
Adams that bi-national same-sex couples are not eligible for immigra-
tion benefits was not overruled by either Obergefell or Windsor. The
Supreme Court in Windsor specifically mentions that "Congress, in
enacting discrete statutes, can make determinations that bear on mari-
tal rights and privileges."14 Justice Kennedy further added "Congress
has the power both to ensure efficiency in the administration of its
programs and to choose what larger goals and policies to pursue.1' 41
Second, President Obama's Executive Action to implement Windsor
was not codified in any Congressional legislation or Executive Order,
thus calling into question whether this executive action is constitution-
ally permissible.142 Finally, the Obergefell decision legalizing same-
sex marriages, including bi-national marriages, addressed the first
prong of the Adams test, but the Court did not and more importantly,
is not authorized by Article I of the Constitution143 to expand the
scope of immigration policies to determine that bi-national same-sex
spouses are eligible for immigrant visas.
B. Matter of Oleg. B. Zeleniak
During the brief period between the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Windsor invalidating Section 3 of DOMA, and the
Court's legalization of same-sex marriages in Obergefell, President
Obama issued an Executive Action to implement Windsor to make bi-
national same-sex marriages eligible for immigration benefits. 44 The
DHS was then instructed to interpret the term "spouse" to include bi-
140. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
141. Id. at 2690 ("Other precedents involving congressional statutes which affect marriages
and family status further illustrate this point. In addressing the interaction of state domestic
relations and federal immigration law Congress determined that marriages 'entered into for the
purpose of procuring an alien's admission [to the United States] as an immigrant' will not qualify
the noncitizen for that status, even if the noncitizen's marriage is valid and proper for state-law
purposes.").
142. For a critical review of President Obama's exercise of executive power, see generally
Daniel Fisher, The President Has as Much Immigration Authority as Congress Gives Him,
FORBES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.forbes.comlsites/danielfisher/2014/11/21/the-president-has-
as-much-immigration-authority-as-congress-gives-himr.
143. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
144. An explanation of an 'executive action' is set forth in United States v. Juarez-Escobar,
25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 783 (W.D. Pa. 2014) ("Executive Actions do not have a legal definition.
Executive actions have been used by Presidents to call on Congress or this Administration to
take action or refrain from taking action ... Executive Actions are not published in the Federal
Register.").
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national same-sex marriages, and that bi-national same-sex spouses
and their children were also eligible to apply for immigration benefits.
The instructions issued by the DHS followed the reasoning of Ad-
ams that "the validity of a particular marriage is determined by the
law of the State where the marriage was celebrated." The instructions
provided that:
As a general matter, the law of the place where the marriage was
celebrated determines whether the marriage is legally valid for immi-
gration purposes. Just as USCIS applies all relevant laws to determine
the validity of an opposite-sex marriage, we will apply all relevant
laws to determine the validity of a same-sex marriage. The domicile
state's laws and policies on same-sex marriages will not bear on
whether USCIS will recognize a marriage as valid. t4
The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") had an opportunity
to apply the DHS's interpretation of Windsor in The Matter of Oleg B.
Zeleniak. 46 In Zeleniak, a bi-national same sex couple sought an im-
migrant visa for the alien spouse of a United States citizen. 147 The
United States citizen filed a petition for Alien Relative (Form I-
130)148 on behalf of his alien same-sex spouse, but the petition was
denied.149 The parties appealed the ruling and during the pendency of
the appeal, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Windsor and over-
turned Section 3 of DOMA.
Utilizing a modified version of the two-prong test that was first
established in Adams, the BIA noted that "the Director has already
determined that the Petitioner's February 24, 2010, marriage is valid
under the laws of Vermont, where the marriage was celebrated." '
145. Napolitano, supra note 19.
146. In re Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec. 158, 158 (B.I.A. 2013).
147. Id. See generally Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015) ("Under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), (citation omitted), an alien may not enter and permanently reside in
the United States without a visa. § 1181(a). The INA creates a special visa-application process
for aliens sponsored by 'immediate relatives' in the United States. §§ 1151(b), 1153(a). Under
this process, the citizen-relative first files a petition on behalf of the alien living abroad, asking to
have the alien classified as an immediate relative; see §§ 1153(f), 1154(a)(1). If and when a
petition is approved, the alien may apply for a visa by submitting the required documents and
appearing at a United States Embassy or consulate for an interview with a consular officer; see
§§ 1201(a)(1), 1202. Before issuing a visa, the consular officer must ensure the alien is not inad-
missible under any provision of the INA § 1361.").
148. Form 1-130. Petition for Alien Relative, OMB No. 1615-0012, expires Dec. 31, 2015,
DHS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. "The purpose of 1-130 is for alien relatives of
U.S. citizens and permanent relatives who want to "immigrate to the United States." http://www
.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-130.pdf.
149. Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec., at 158.
150. Id. at 160.
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However, the BIA did not follow the holding in Adams. In Zeleniak,
the BIA concluded that the Windsor decision "removed Section 3 of
the DOMA as an impediment to the recognition" of binational same-
sex marriage for immigration purposes. In Zeleniak, the BIA re-
manded the visa petition back to the Director for an "inquiry [regard-
ing] whether the petitioner has established that his marriage to the
beneficiary is bona fide." '151
There are several problems with this analysis. There is no refer-
ence made by the BIA in Zeleniak to Adams or more specifically, to
the second prong of the Adams test which focuses the inquiry not on
the validity of the marriage, but on whether Congress intended to rec-
ognize such marriages for immigration purposes. This analysis ig-
nored the plenary powers of Congress to determine the immigrant
visa eligibility criteria for aliens, and presumed, without any Congres-
sional guidance, that binational same-sex marriages and alien spouses
are eligible for immigration benefits.
The Obergefell decision abrogated the portion of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Adams that questioned the legality of same-sex mar-
riages, but the precedential value of Adams as it pertains to
determining whether binational same-sex marriages are eligible for
immigration benefits remains unanswered. Although there is no ques-
tion that Windsor invalidated the federal definition of marriage, the
Windsor decision did not invalidate the long-standing plenary powers
doctrine which specifically authorizes Congress, not the Executive or
judiciary to determine whether aliens qualify for immigration benefits.
To date, Congress has not spoken on this issue. As noted by the Ninth
Circuit in Adams, Congress has not indicated an intent to enlarge the
151. Id. The BIA remanded the matter for a determination of whether the alien "would
qualif[y] as a spouse under the Act, which includes the requirement that the marriage must be
bona fide." Id. at 158. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a) (2007). See generally Bark v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that to determine the validity of a marriage
for immigration purposes, immigration courts have looked to the holding in Bark) (holding that
petitioner must establish a life together at the time of the marriage. Marriages that failed to meet
this standard are commonly referred to as sham or fraudulent marriages). Immigration courts
have longstanding jurisprudence to guide the analysis regarding the validity of a marriage. See
generally Phillis, 15 I. & N. Dec. 385, 386 (B.I.A. 1975) (citing Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec., at 158)
("Although a marriage may be given legal effect in the United States or abroad, we are not
required to recognize it for the purpose of conferring immigration benefits where the marriage
was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws"); In re Laureano, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 1, 2 (B.I.A. 1983) (holding that marriages entered into the purpose of evading or "circum-
venting immigration laws" have not been recognized as enabling an alien spouse to obtain immi-
gration benefits) (citing Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec., at 158); In re McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332,
334-35 (B.I.A. 1980) (adopting the same legal analysis regarding the test to determine the valid-
ity of a marriage for immigration purposes).
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ordinary meaning of those words. In the absence of such a congres-
sional directive, it would be inappropriate for us to expand the mean-
ing of the term 'spouse' for immigration purposes."' 52 Certainly the
executive and judiciary can make educated guesses about whether
Congress will amend the INA to extend marital benefits to binational
same-sex spouses, but Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitu-
tion153 expressly entrusts Congress with the power to regulate immi-
gration. The Ninth Circuit in Adams acknowledged that Congress'
plenary power over immigration constrained the Court from con-
ducting a more exacting evaluation of the parties' claims. Noting that,
"Congress has almost plenary power to admit or exclude aliens ...
and the decisions of Congress are subject only to limited judicial re-
view. '15 4 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had
previously upheld "the broad power of Congress to determine immi-
gration policy" even when constitutional challenges are raised regard-
ing immigration policies.' 5  Citing Mathews v. Diaz,5 6 the Ninth
Circuit in Adams relied upon the longstanding principle that "Con-
gress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens.' 1 57 As evidenced by the significance of the Obergefell deci-
sion, the impact of regulations that discriminate against same-sex
couples is certainly relevant when deciding intra-territorial disputes.
But within the field of immigration, judicial decisions that resolve con-
stitutional challenges raised by United States citizens and lawful per-
manent residents are not dispositive.
The judiciary does give substantial deference "where a statute has
been interpreted by the agency charged with its enforcement ....1,158
That judicial deference, is not however, absolute. A Court will with-
hold deference where "there are compelling indications" the agencies
interpretation is wrong.159 In this matter, the DHS's decision to af-
ford immigration benefits to binational same-sex couples may not be
152. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated by Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
153. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
154. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1041.
155. Id. at 1041-42. ("Faced with numerous challenges to laws governing the exclusion of
aliens and the expulsion of resident and non-resident aliens, the Court has consistently reaf-
firmed the power of Congress to legislate in this area.").
156. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
157. Id. at 80.
158. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040.
159. New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973); see also Silway-
Rodriguez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 975 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1992).
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wrong or even inconsistent with Congressional intent. However, since
Congress has not spoken to this issue, there is no way to determine
what the Congressional intent would be. As Justice Scalia observed in
Lawrence v. Texas, sweeping societal changes "are to be made by the
people, and not imposed by a governing caste that knows best.' 60
IV. PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
Although the Supreme Court in Obergefell determined that
same-sex couples have a constitutionally protected right to marry, the
Court has not abrogated the plenary power doctrine in that decision.
The invalidation of section 3 of DOMA by the Court in Windsor
paved the way for President Obama to direct the DHS to issue a di-
rective to recognize binational same-sex marriages in the same man-
ner that heterosexual marriages are treated. However, the Windsor
decision had no impact on the continued viability of the plenary
power doctrine. The implementation of these decisions was accepted
as an exercise of executive authority but the practical effect of the
change was to broaden the definition of the statutory definitions of
the terms 'spouse' and 'marriage' found in the INA, and ignore long-
standing jurisprudence that recognizes Congress' plenary power to
regulate the field of immigration.
The field of Immigration law differs significantly from other areas
of law regulated by the federal government. 16 1 First, the constitu-
tional underpinnings of federal immigration law are founded in the
inherent sovereign powers of the nation.1 62 As early as 1888, the Su-
preme Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion
Case),'163 held that "[t]he power of exclusion [admission] of foreigners
being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the
United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment
160. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. See generally Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1465 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Although the Consti-
tution fails to delegate specifically the power over immigration, the Supreme Court recognized
almost a century ago that the political branches have plenary authority over immigration matters
as an inherent concomitant of national security.").
162. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("It is an accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty and
essential to preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit
term only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United
States, this power is vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has committed
the entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in war.").
163. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) ("The Chinese Exclusion Case").
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of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one." '64 This broad grant
of power is shared between the legislative and executive branches of
the federal government. 6 ' As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Jean v.
Nelson,'66 "Congress and the Executive branch share the immigration
power . . . . It may be exercised by the Executive and the Senate
through the execution of treaties, id., through the legislative powers of
Congress ... and in part by the Executive branch acting alone, as a
function of its plenary authority over foreign relations."'67 Second,
Congress is the branch of government that "traditionally exercises au-
thority over matters of immigration and exclusion through passage of
immigration legislation." '168 Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Con-
stitution grants to Congress the authority to "establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization." '69 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
constitutional provision as a broad, unqualified grant of plenary
power to Congress to regulate the admission and removal of aliens
from the United States. 7 ' In Fiallo v. Bell,'7 ' the Supreme Court
reasserted the principle that " 'over no conceivable subject is the legis-
lative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission
of aliens." '172 The exercise of Congress' plenary power authorizes
Congress to enact legislation that could "exclude aliens altogether, or
prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may enter and
stay in this country."' 73 The authority of Congress to enact immigra-
164. Id. at 603, 609 ("That the government of the United States, through the action of the
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not
think open to controversy."); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893)
("The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized, or taken
any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as abso-
lute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.").
165. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972) ("In summary, plenary Congres-
sional power to make policies, and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established
... Congress has delegated conditional exercise of this power of the Executive.").
166. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983).
167. Id. at 1465-66.
168. Id. at 1466; see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898) ("The
power, granted to Congress by the Constitution, 'to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,'
was long ago adjudged by this court to be vested exclusively in congress.").
169. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
170. For a thorough analysis of the plenary power doctrine see Janel Thankul, The Plenary
Power-Shaped Hole in the Core Constitutional Law Curriculum: Exclusion, Unequal Protection,
and American National Identity, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 553 (2008); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigra-
tion Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 255.
171. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
172. Id. at 792.
173. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914).
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tion legislation is consistent with Article I, § 1 which clearly authorizes
Congress to enact federal laws.1 74
The allocation of authority to Congress to enact legislation regu-
lating immigration of alien spouses is unquestioned. The Supreme
Court in Kerry v. Din1 75 noted "as soon as Congress began legislating
in this area it enacted a complicated web of regulations that erected
serious impediments to a person's ability to bring a spouse into the
United States." '176 Noting specifically that familial immigration is "a
matter of legislative grace rather than fundamental right," the Su-
preme Court has consistently upheld Congressional legislation gov-
erning the immigration of alien spouses.
The fact that Congress enacts legislation that governs marital re-
lationships, an area traditionally governed by State law, does not serve
an impediment to its constitutional validity. The Supreme Court has
recognized Congress' plenary power to "enact discrete statutes . . .
that bear on marital rights and privileges."' 77 Citing INA section
216(b)(1), 178 which makes sham marriages ineligible for immigration
benefits, the Court noted that Congressional regulations intersect
"state domestic relations and federal immigration law" illustrate "dis-
crete examples [that] establish the constitutionality of limited federal
laws that regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal
policy." 179
Historic administration of immigration laws and policies offer
only a minimal opportunity for judicial review.'80 When called to
evaluate questionable immigration policies, federal courts defer to
Congress' plenary immigration powers.18 ' The Supreme has consist-
ently recognized limited judicial review of Congress' exercise of its
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States .... ").
175. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
176. Id. at 2135-36 ("Even where Congress has provided special privileges to promote family
immigration, it has also 'written in careful checks and qualifications.' ").
177. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013).
178. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1) (2014).
179. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
180. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("The Chinese Exclusion
Case") ("If ... [the] legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different
race ... to be dangerous to its peace and security .... its determination is conclusive upon the
judiciary.").
181. Nevada Lifestyles, Inc., 3 O.C.A.H.O. 463 (U.S. Dep't of Just. Oct. 16, 1992) ("At the
heart of that sentiment lies the 'plenary power' doctrine, under which the court has declined to
review federal immigration statutes for compliance with substantive constitutional restraints. In
an undeviating line of cases spanning almost one hundred years, the Court has declared itself
powerless to review ... immigration provisions.").
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plenary power to regulate immigration. 182 As the Court held in Fiallo
v. Bell, the immigration categories enacted by Congress are "policy
questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Gov-
ernment, and we have no judicial authority to substitute our political
judgment for that of the Congress. '183
V. CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE -
EXCEPTION TO CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Generally, the agency charged with enforcing a statute, such as
the INA, has the authority to interpret terms that are not statutorily
defined."' The DHS is the agency charged with enforcing the INA.'85
As the Supreme Court in New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dub-
lino,186 held substantial deference is accorded to agency determina-
tions "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong .... ".187
It is questionable whether the DHS's decision 88 to broadly interpret
the term 'spouse' as defined in INA § 101(a)(35) to include aliens in
binational same-sex couples would warrant judicial deference. Fed-
eral courts use the two-part test established by the Supreme Court in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.' 89 to
182. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1997); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 596-97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The conditions of entry for every alien, the
particular classes of aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such
classification, the right to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determina-
tion shall be based, have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress
and wholly outside of the power of this Court to control.").
183. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 798; see Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53,
72-73 (2001) (noting that "wide deference [is] afforded to Congress in the exercise of its immi-
gration and naturalization power." The Court upheld § 309(a) of the INA which permitted un-
wed mothers to confer citizenship status on their illegitimate children under conditions that were
substantially more favorable than those imposed upon fathers of illegitimate children. The Su-
preme Court upheld the clearly gender-based discriminatory statute, holding that the gender
distinction did not violate the equal protection clause).
184. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated by Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012).
186. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
187. Id. at 421.
188. See In re Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec. 158, 159 (B.I.A. 2013) (concluding that following
Windsor, section 3 of DOMA is no longer "an impediment to the recognition of lawful same-sex
marriages").
189. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In reaching
the decision by a 6-0 vote, Justice John Paul Stevens, writing the opinion for the court, estab-
lished a two-part test commonly referred to as the "Chevron Test" to determine whether judicial
deference is warranted when reviewing the interpretation of a statute by an administrative
agency.
The Chevron Test provides that:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has di-
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determine whether judicial deference is appropriate to an interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous statute by an administrative agency.190 Defer-
ence will be afforded to an agency's interpretation where such
interpretation is "permissible" or "reasonable".'19
However, judicial deference is not applicable for "an agency's in-
terpretation of a statute if it 'presents serious constitutional difficul-
ties."' 192 The canon of constitutional avoidance as set forth by the
Ninth Circuit in Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft,193 provides that, "[a]lthough
we recognize that, in general, the Attorney General interpretation of
the immigration laws is entitled to substantial deference ... Chevron
principles are not applicable where a substantial constitutional ques-
tion is raised by an agency's interpretation of a statute it is authorized
to construe."'1
94
The DHS's broad interpretation of the INA's definition of
"spouse" to include recognition same-sex binational marriages falls
squarely within this exception. In Diouf v. Napolitano,195 the Ninth
Circuit, citing Kim Ho Ma,196 weighed granting Chevron deference to
a DHS's interpretation of regulations that permitted prolonged deten-
tion of aliens in removal proceedings.' 97 The Ninth Circuit analyzed
this issue by applying the canon of constitutional avoidance to deter-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Con-
gress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43.
190. See Ann Graham, Chevron Lite: How Much Deference Should Courts Give to State
Agency Interpretation?, 68 LA. L. REV. 1105 (2008); Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?:
The Supreme Court's Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2012); Daniel T. Shedd & Todd Garvey, Chevron Deference: Court Treatment
of Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., (2013).
191. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-44 (stating that an agency's regulation contains a
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
192. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("But we do not
abandon Chevron deference at the mere mention of a possible constitutional problem; the argu-
ment must be serious.").
193. Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001).
194. Id. at 1105, n.15; see also Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011).
195. Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011).
196. Kim Ho Ma, 257 F.3d at 1105 n.15.
197. Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1089 ("The government argues that we should accord Chevron defer-
ence to these regulations, which address the issue of prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by
providing for one or more 'post-order custody reviews' by DHS employees, but not for an inde-
pendent determination of the need for continued detention by a neutral decision-maker such as
an immigration judge.").
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mine whether deference to the DHS's detention policies raised "con-
stitutional problems.' '1 98
In Diouf, the Court determined that the government's interpreta-
tion of the regulation raised "serious constitutional concerns" 199 be-
cause the regulation infringed upon the alien's procedural due process
rights and could lead to "an erroneous deprivation of liberty."2 '
Applying the canon of constitutional avoidance to evaluate the
DHS's decision to implement Windsor by expanding the definitions of
"marriage" and "spouse" to include binational same sex couples, leads
to the conclusion that the DHS extrapolated this analysis beyond the
point where judicial deference would be warranted. 2 1 Constitutional
concerns are certainly raised regarding the infringement on Congress'
plenary power to determine the categories of aliens eligible for immi-
gration visas. Additionally, federalism questions are raised when the
federal government attempts to define the definition of marriage, an
area that has been traditionally defined by state laws. 2
The INA section 1103(a)(1) provides in pertinent part that a "de-
termination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all
questions of law shall be controlling. 20 3  The federal judiciary has
concluded that this grant of authority means "Congress left the inter-
pretation of [the INA] to the BIA and interpretation of its application
to state and federal laws to federal courts. '2 0 4 However, there is a
198. Id. at 1088-89 ("[W]hen deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to
adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would
raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail-whether or not those
constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the court."). See generally Brian
G. Slocum, Canons, The Plenary Power Doctrine, and Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
363, 411 (2007).
199. Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1091.
200. Id. at 1091-92.
201. Former United States Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and Immigration attorney
David N. Strange strongly criticized President Obama's executive action that "extended federal
immigration benefits to the same-sex foreign spouse[s] of United States citizens." Gonzales and
Strange argued that:
Under the Constitution, as the decisions in Windsor and Adams recognize, Congress
has almost total power over immigration, and its decisions in this realm are subject to
limited judicial review. Where there is only a rational basis for Congress's exercise of
power, whether articulate or not, courts must uphold the immigration laws that Con-
gress enacts. In our view, the DOMA decision does not appear to override the Ninth
Circuit's 1982 ruling.
Alberto R. Gonzales & David N. Strange, What The Opinion Didn't Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 17,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/opinion/what-the-court-didnt-say.html.
202. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) ("Federalism, central to the con-
stitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have ele-
ments of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.").
203. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012).
204. Cisneros-Guerrera v. Holder, 774 F.3d 1056, 1058 (5th Cir. 2014).
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significant difference between interpreting the parameters of INA
statutes and regulations, and implementing policies that expand the
eligibility categories for immigrant visa applicants to include bina-
tional same-sex alien spouses without constitutional impact or direc-
tive. The former is permissible, the latter is not.
VI. EXECUTIVE ACTION VIOLATES THE
"TAKE CARE CLAUSE"
An evaluation of President Obama's Executive Action directing
the DHS to recognize bona fide marriages between binational same-
sex couples under section 1101(a)(35)2 °5 raises concerns regarding
whether this executive action violates the "Take Care" Clause of the
Constitution.20 6 The Take Care Clause, as it is commonly referred to,
is set forth in Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution.2 °7
It provides, in pertinent part, that the executive "shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed. ' 2°8 In one of its earliest immigration
decisions, the Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case20 9 de-
scribed the scope of the executive's authority as "[t]he president is
charged with the duty and invested with the power to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed. '210 President Obama's executive ac-
tion expanded the categories of aliens who may become eligible for
immigrant visas; an area that is exclusively within the Congress' legis-
lative authority.211 Although it is correct that the terms 'marriage'
and 'spouse' as defined in the INA do not expressly prohibit recogni-
tion of binational same-sex couples, prior to President Obama's exec-
utive action implementing Windsor, the provisions of the INA
pertaining to marital relationships were historically interpreted in op-
posite gender ways.
205. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35).
206. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
207. Id.; see TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND EXEC-
UTIVE DISCRETION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW R43708 (2014).
208. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
209. See Char Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605 (1889) ("The Chinese Exclusion
Case").
210. Id.
211. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-94 (1977); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
596-97 (1952) ("The conditions of entry for every alien, the particular classes of aliens that shall
be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification, the right to terminate
hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based, have been recog-
nized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of
this Court to control.").
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In this situation, President Obama's executive action directly im-
pacts Congress' legislative authority to define the categories of aliens
who may become eligible to immigrate to the United States, and ex-
ceeds the scope of authority delegated to the executive branch of gov-
ernment. As expressed in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA2 2 by
the Supreme Court, "[w]hile 'the power of executing the laws neces-
sarily includes both authority and responsibility to resolve some ques-
tions left open by Congress that arise during the law's administration,'
it does not include the power to unilaterally enact legislation., 213
A similar question regarding the constitutionality of President
Obama's efforts to implement immigration reform was raised in
United States v. Juarez-Escobar.214 In Juarez-Escobar the District
Court examined the Executive Action implemented by President
Obama on November 20, 2014.215 The Executive action announced
new border enforcement policies that "would prioritize deportation
on 'actual threats to our society.'" 216 In Juarez-Escobar, the District
Court questioned "whether the nature of the Executive Action is ex-
ecutive or legislative" because the Executive action had "an impact on
any subsequent removal or deportation" decisions made by the De-
partment of Homeland Security.217
To determine the constitutionality of President Obama's Execu-
tive Action, the District Court relied upon the Take Care Clause to
consider whether the Executive action violated the separation of pow-
ers mandated by the United States Constitution.218 The court noted
that "[u]nder our system of government in the United States, Con-
gress enact laws and the President, acting at time through agencies,
'faithfully execute[s]' them."2 9 The District Court found that the Ex-
ecutive Action "cross[es] the line" by infringing upon the legislative
authority of Congress to determine immigration policies for aliens re-
212. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014).
213. Id. at 2446.
214. United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 775-76 (W.D.Pa. 2014).
215. Id. at 778-80 (explaining this criticism of President Obama's governance is similar to the
concerns raised about his executive action to implement immigration reform). See generally id. at
786 ("Further, President Obama's belief that this Executive Action is within his executive au-
thority is not dispositive because the separation of powers does not depend on the views of
individual Presidents, nor on whether the encroached-upon branch approves the
encroachment.").
216. Id. at 787.
217. Id. at 780.
218. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2087 (2015).
219. Id.
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siding in the United States.22 0 As a result, the Court held that "Presi-
dent Obama's unilateral legislative action violates the separation of
powers provided for in the United States Constitution as well as the
Take Care Clause, and therefore, is unconstitutional."2 2'
A similar argument was made by 26 States that filed an action to
enjoin implementation of President Obama's November 20, 2014 Ex-
ecutive Action.222 Republican supporters of Texas v. United States,
223
"accused Obama of improperly bypassing Congress" ' 4 to enact immi-
gration reform. The November 20, 2014 Executive Action at issue,
commonly referred to as Deferred action for Parents ("DAPA"), 225
sought to expand the President's exercise of prosecutorial discretion
by expanding the Deferred Action for Children ("DACA") 2 6 pro-
gram to include parents of American and lawful permanent residents
who are illegally residing in the United States. The United States
220. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 785-86 (citing Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
587 (1952) ("In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his
functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing
of laws he thinks bad.")).
221. Id. at 786 ("The President must 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ... he
may not take executive action that creates laws. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.").
222. Arpaio Reply Br. 4.
223. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 773, 743 (5th Cir. 2015).
224. David Nakamura, Appeals Court Rules Against Obama on Immigration Program,
WASH. POST. (May 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/appeals-court-rules-
against-obama-on-immigration/2015/05/26/7546832a-03d9-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4estory.html.
225. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., EXECUTIVE ACTIONS OF IMMIGRA-
TION, www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) ("On November 20, 2014, the
President announced a series of executive actions .... These initiatives include[d]: Allowing
parents of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents to request deferred action and
employment authorization for three years, in a new Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents program, provided they have lived in the United States contin-
uously since January 1, 2010, and pass required background checks."); Texas, 787 F.3d at 769
(issuing an order temporarily suspending implementation of DAPA).
226. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., CONSIDERATION FOR DEFERRED ACTION
FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA), www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-ac-
tion-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) ("On June 15, 2012, the Secretary of
Homeland Security announced that certain people who came to the United States as children
and meet several guidelines may request consideration of deferred action for a period of two
years, subject to renewal. They are also eligible for work authorization. Deferred action is a use
of prosecutorial discretion to defer removal against an individual for a certain period of time.
Deferred action does not provide lawful status."); see also AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL,
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS: A RESOURCE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL, www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-resource-
page (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) ("In June of 2012, the Obama administration announced that it
would accept requests for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), an initiative de-
signed to temporarily suspend the deportation of young people residing unlawfully in the United
States as children, meet certain education requirements and generally match the criteria estab-
lished under legislative proposals like the DREAM ACT.").
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raised a number of challenges 227 to the DAPA program, including that
implementation of DAPA "violated the President's constitutional duty
to 'take care that the Laws be faithfully executed. U.S. Const. Art. II,
§ 3. " 228
This issue becomes even more difficult when immigration policy
crosscuts the traditional definition of marriage. Immigration jurispru-
dence draws a clear distinction between the right of heterosexual
American citizens to marry the person of their choosing and the privi-
lege of conferring an immigration benefit on an alien spouse. The for-
mer is protected by the Constitution, the latter is not. Federal courts
have clearly held that "while an American citizen has the constitu-
tional right to marry whomever she chooses, she does not have a con-
stitutional right to have that person live in the United States. 229 The
question of whether same-sex couples have a constitutionally pro-
tected right to marry was resolved by the Supreme Court in
Obergefell.23 ° That decision does not definitely resolve this issue
within the field of immigration law.
Congress, not the executive, has the sole authority to enact immi-
gration legislation that can expand the INA's definitions of the terms
'marriage' and 'spouse' to include binational same-sex couples.
Clearly, the executive branch may exercise prosecutorial discretion
when enforcing immigration policies. However, the executive branch
exceeds the scope of power delegated to it by the Constitution when it
unilaterally expanded the immigration visa categories to include
spouses in binational same-sex marriages.
CONCLUSION
The holding in Obergefell that same-sex marriage is constitution-
ally protected does not, a fortiori, lead to the conclusion that immigra-
tion policies must change accordingly. It is certainly conceivable that
a newly-elected, conservative executive could rescind President
Obama's executive action, and refuse to grant binational same-sex
couples access to immigration benefits. The historic jurisprudential
and legislative framework of immigration law recognizes and accepts
227. Texas, 787 F.3d at 743 (noting that states raised a number of challenges to the DAPA
program including that the "DAPA's implementation violated APA").
228. Id. (deciding on other grounds and the District Court did not address the States' "con-
stitutional claims under the Take Care Clause/Separation of Powers doctrine").
229. Ruiz-Herrera v. Holder, No. 1:12-cv-0194, 2013 WL 1136849, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15,
2013).
230. Obergerfell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
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that a clear legal distinction exists between intra-territorial and extra-
territorial immigration policies.231 In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme
Court cites to its holding in Mathews v. Diaz,2 32 for the principle that
"in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturaliza-
tion, 'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.' "5233
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision, an alien spouse in
binational same-sex marriage has no standing to challenge Congress'
refusal to grant them an immigration visa based upon their marital
status.23' As Justice Brewer stated in his dissenting opinion in Fong
Yue Ting, "[t]he Constitution has no extra-territorial effect, and those
who have not come lawfully within our territory cannot claim any pro-
tection from its provisions. "235
Curative legislative reform is the most effective and efficient
means of addressing this problem. During the 113th Congressional
session, and more recently the 114th Congressional session, California
Senator, Dianne Feinstein introduced a bill entitled "The Respect for
Marriage Act ("RMA") '236 to address this issue. RMA creates a gen-
eral neutral federal definition of marriage. RMA provides that a fed-
eral marriage is one that:
For the purposes of any Federal law in which marital status is a
factor, an individual shall be considered married if that individual's
marriage is valid in the State where the marriage was entered into
or, in the case of a marriage entered into outside any State, if the
marriage is valid in the place where entered into and the marriage
could have been entered into in a State.237
231. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("The distinction between an alien who
has affected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout
.mmigration law ...It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to
persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside our geographic borders.").
232. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
233. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citing Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81-82); see also
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, ET. AL., Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 200
(7th ed. 2012) ("Put differently, our constitutional law relating to immigration may differ from
our constitutional law relating to noncitizen immigrants.").
234. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015) (This action was brought by the United State
citizen spouse because that alien spouse lacked standing to challenge the DHS's refusal to issue
an immigration visa. "Naturally, one would expect him-not Din-to bring this suit. But be-
cause Berashk is an unadmitted and nonresident alien, he has no right of entry into the United
States, and no cause of action to press in furtherance of his claim for admission.").
235. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
236. S. 29, 114th Cong. (2015).
237. S. 29, 114th Cong. § 7 (2015). However, the holding of Obergefell renders this provision
unnecessary.
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As long as the plenary powers doctrine remains an integral part
of constitutional jurisprudence, Congress will retain its legislative au-
thority to determine eligibility standards for an immigrant's visa. As a
result, eligibility determinations for binational same-sex couples will
remain unsettled, and subject to political uncertainty. 38 The passage
of RMA will address this problem, and pave the way for binational
same-sex couples to apply for immigration visas, and seek the benefits
derived from family reunification in the United States; a benefit that is
one of the foundational cornerstones of our nation's immigration
policy.
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238. KEVIN JOHNSON, THE HUDDLED MASSES MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 147
(2004) ("Changing the family-based immigration provisions to permit the immigration of part-
ners of person of the same-sex requires a reconceptualization of 'family' for the purposes of the
immigration laws.").
